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ABSTRACT
The connection between Russia and European political parties has been in the
scholarly and popular spotlight recently. While scholars focus on the
connection between the far right (and populist) parties and Russia, they have
all but ignored the rapidly increasing literature on the role of political parties
in foreign policy. This article provides an attempt to bridge these literatures.
After analyzing a corpus of party manifestos, the results suggest that there is
temporal variation in how European parties have seen Russia since the end of
the Cold War. European parties tended to be mostly positive in their views of
Russia prior to 2015. Geography and ideology were much less important as a
factor in explaining party positions. While some ideological groups share
attitudes across diﬀerent borders, the overall inﬂuence of ideology on
attitudes toward Russia is minimal.
KEYWORDS Party politics; Russia; foreign policy; Europe; ideology; Crimea
The connection between Russia and European far right and populist political
parties has been in the scholarly and popular spotlight in recent years. This
has beenmotivated by three factors: Firstly, there is abundant evidence of intel-
lectual fascination on the part ofmany of the Europe’s current “troublemakers”
with Putin’s Russia (Braghiroli & Makarychev, 2016; Krekó & Szabados, 2009;
Political Capital Institute, 2014; Polyakova, 2014; Stéphane & Schmitt, 2015).
Secondly, many of these extremist parties pursue goals similar to those
pushed by Putin’s Russia, such as limiting cooperationwith Europe, promoting
stronger roles for the national states, and placing limits on the rights of min-
orities (whether ethnic, religious, or sexual) (Gressel, 2017; Klapsis, 2017; Pol-
itical Capital Institute, 2014; Roháč, Zgut, & Győri, 2017). Thirdly, many of
these parties enjoy active connections with Russia, whether by participating
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in various networks or by cooperating with various Russian agents (Hénin,
2016; Krekó et al., 2015; Polyakova, 2014; Schmitt, 2017, 2018).
While most of the scholarly attention has focused on the connection
between the far right (and populist) parties and Russia, scholars have noted
too that the appeal to anti-imperialism and the ﬁght against the American
hegemony has also provided a connection between the far left and Russia
(Braghiroli & Makarychev, 2016; Stéphane & Schmitt, 2015). Curiously,
little conceptual link has been done between the scholarship studying
extreme parties’ connections with (and interest in) Russia on one hand, and
the increasing academic interest in the study of the role of political parties
in foreign policy on the other hand. The scholarship on the role of parties
in foreign policy has focused on the role of ideology, and has seen a true
explosion of the scholarship in recent years (Blarel & van Willigen, 2017;
Fonck, Haesebrouck, & Reykers, 2019; Herbel, 2017; Kaarbo & Kenealy,
2017; Mello, 2012, 2014; Raunio &Wagner, 2017; Wagner, Herranz-Surrallés,
Kaarbo, & Ostermann, 2018). However, understanding European parties’ past
and present view on Russia is crucial for sketching prospects for future
cooperation (or confrontation) with Russia. If European parties held deep-
seated antagonism toward Russia, the potential for overcoming existing
antagonism and for future cooperation would be extremely limited.
The present article seeks to make three contributions to the existing scho-
larship on parties and foreign policy. Firstly, the article bridges scholarship on
party politics of foreign policy and the scholarship on attitudes toward Russia
by studying the variation in partisan attitudes toward Russia. Secondly, it
brings a new source of data to the table: an analysis of a corpus of party mani-
festos developed within the Comparative Manifesto Project (Merz, Regel, &
Lewandowski, 2016; Volkens et al., 2018). Thirdly, the article systematically
studies variation along ideological, geographical, and temporal lines.
The results provide four key takeaways. Firstly, European parties have paid
very little attention to Russia in their party manifestos. Secondly, prior to
Russia’s invasion of Crimea, European parties frequently held positive
views of Russia (or were ambivalent toward the country), and did not see
the country as a threat. Save for a few exceptions, they did not hold deep-
seated hostility toward Russia. Their current critical attitude is rather a reac-
tion to Russia’s actions in Ukraine. Thirdly, geography—the proximity to
Russia—has not structured attitudes toward the country. Fourthly, except
for some small patterns, it is diﬃcult to point to ideology as an inﬂuential
factor in the attitudes toward Russia.
The remainder of the article continues as follows. The second section pro-
vides a theoretical argument about the variation in partisan views on Russia.
The third section outlines the methodology of the present study, while the
fourth section presents the results and analyzes them. In the concluding
section, I oﬀer possible avenues for future research on this issue.
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Toward a theory of party variation on Russia
Explaining party positions toward Russia requires us to consider three
diﬀerent angles. Firstly, it is the growing body of scholarship on partisan poli-
tics of foreign and security policy. This scholarship has experienced an expan-
sion in the recent years, and has focused mainly on the approval of military
missions abroad. This focus on party politics stems from the long-standing
focus of the comparative foreign policy analysis ﬁeld on the innenpolitik
aspects of foreign policy-making, and has focused in particular on the
impact of partisan ideology on foreign policy preferences. However, studying
party politics of relations with another country, especially one so close as
Russia is to Europe, requires consideration of the structural conditions
which shape how countries are exposed to. Geography captures many of
these considerations. Last but not least, the foreign policy toward the third
countries is at least partially a function of their actions. While there are
many ways to capture the other actors’ actions, longitudinal analysis can be
used to capture developments in the other actors’ policy. Therefore, in this
article, I will focus on three aspects to explain the variations in parties’
views of Russia: partisan ideology, geography, and across time.
Partisan ideology
Recent studies have explored the partisan politics behind the variation in par-
ticipation in (and approval of) military interventions (Fonck et al., 2019;
Mello, 2014; Raunio & Wagner, 2017; Wagner, Herranz-Surralles, Kaarbo,
& Ostermann, 2017). As Wagner et al. (2017) explain, in the post-Cold
War period, the use of military has become associated less with conﬂict,
and more with spread of human rights and “wars of choice.” This is in con-
trast to the Cold War, when the left was historically associated with opposi-
tion to militarism.
This opposition to militarism has also often led to calls for peaceful coex-
istence with the Soviet Union and the ﬁght against “aggressive” foreign policy,
which has often meant being soft and accommodating toward Soviet Union.
Scholars have argued that the contemporary far left, although much less
powerful compared to her predecessors, continues to hold these attitudes
(Gressel, 2017; Krekó & Győri, 2016). This makes attitudes toward Russia
diﬀerent from attitudes toward the United States. There is a partisan aspect
to the anti-Americanism and attitudes toward the United States, especially
through attitudes toward militarism and capitalism (Beyer & Liebe, 2014;
Everts & Isernia, 2015; Katzenstein & Keohane, 2007). However, especially
after the end of the Cold War, there is no reason to expect much variation
among the parties in their attitudes toward Russia on the basis of partizanship
in the traditional left-right sense.
528 M. ONDERCO
However, the emphases that individual parties put on diﬀerent agendas
may shape their attitudes toward Russia. For example, as Braghiroli (2015)
demonstrates, the liberal parties in the European Parliament, which focus
on human rights, tend to be more critical of Russia’s human rights record.
Given Russia’s recent attempts to promote itself as a standard-bearer for
the cooperation of sovereign countries, traditional morality, and identitarian-
ism, we could expect that the fringe parties that argue that theWest is in decay
and that the supranational integration has reached too far would be more
positively attuned to Russia over time (Braghiroli & Makarychev, 2016;
Gressel, 2017; Klapsis, 2017). While far-right parties are frequently associated
with such belief, appeals to morality and limits to European integration are
not limited to far-right parties (Stéphane & Schmitt, 2015). This belief is
associated in general with Eurosceptic views, and similar beliefs form part
of what Marks, Hooghe, Nelson, and Edwards (2006) call “traditional-author-
itarian-nationalist” (TAN) parties (as opposed to the “green-alternative-liber-
tarian” (GAL) parties). Therefore, one could expect that the more parties
espouse the TAN ideology, the more likely they are going to be positive
about Russia, since they (in principle) espouse the same values. This means
that European parties associated with the traditional values would be more
pro-Russian. At the same time, we could also expect that the more nationalis-
tic parties are, the more appeal Russia’s nationalist message will have, and
therefore we might expect parties scoring high on nationalism to hold positive
views of Russia (Gressel, 2017; Stéphane & Schmitt, 2015).
Geographical proximity
Europe’s relations with Russia have historically been shaped along geographi-
cal lines. Eastern Europe was for four decades subjected to direct Russian
interference, whereas in Western Europe, the Cold War was perceived
through both the prism of ideological struggle and the fear of military inter-
vention. These experiences shaped how actors saw the Soviet Union and later
Russia (Applebaum, 2012; Judt, 2005).
This ﬁnding is consistent with the ﬁndings from the study of international
conﬂict. Scholars have long recognized geography as a relevant factor to
explain the cooperation and conﬂict between countries (Diehl, 1991; Oneal,
Oneal, Maoz, & Russett, 1996). It is logical that the closer countries are, the
more opportunities they have for conﬂict. However, the ﬂipside of the geogra-
phy argument demonstrates that geographically close countries which trade
extensively are more likely to have cooperative relations (Robst, Polachek,
& Chang, 2007). This relationship is, however, frequently moderated by
both the nature of the goods that countries trade, and how widely the
beneﬁts of the trade are shared (Copeland, 2014; Goenner, 2010; Press-Bar-
nathan, 2006).
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At the end of the ColdWar, driven by the desire to free themselves from the
Soviet (and later Russian) inﬂuence, Eastern European countries pursued a
policy of political integration with the West, especially the EU and NATO.
This desire was partially a response to the potential threat from Russia
(Grayson, 1999; Marten, 2018). Over time, Eastern European countries have
come to be seen as strongly pro-American. Scholars of democracy promotion
have noted that the desire to spread democratic norms further into the East has
been strongly held by Central and Eastern European governments after their
entry to the European Union and NATO (Balogh, 2012; Berti, Mikulova, &
Popescu, 2016; Dangerﬁeld, 2009). Given Russia’s view that these activities
constitute interference in her sphere of inﬂuence, it is not inconceivable that
the Eastern European countries might hold more negative views of Russia.
Geographical proximity, augmented by the historical experience, might
have made Eastern European parties reasonably more negatively predisposed
toward Russia compared to parties in other parts of Europe. This expectation
would ﬁt with arguments recently made by Sauer (2017) who argued that
NATO was pushed toward a stronger confrontation with Russia by its
Eastern European members. On the other hand, because of the relative geo-
graphical distance, parties in Western European countries (as well as
countries in the Southern Europe) might have a lower threat perception stem-
ming from Russia. Put bluntly, threat perception of Russia is diﬀerent in
Tallinn than in Lisbon.
Therefore, I expect that if geography played a role, the parties in Eastern
Europe would be more negative toward Russia compared to parties in other
parts of Europe.
Developments over time
While the whole period under study takes place in the post-Cold War period
when the competition between the West and East had already become a
matter of the past, it is expected that time plays a role. Controlling for a
time (or a time period) allows us to capture variations in Russian policy
and actions toward its neighbours—whether the near ones, or the more
distant ones (such as the EU).
As scholars of Russian foreign policy have extensively noted, Russian
relations with, and attitudes toward the West have changed signiﬁcantly
since 1990s (Haukkala, 2015; Hopf, 2016, 2018; McFaul, 2018). While there
has been earnest, extensive cooperation between the East and the West in
economic as well as security issues (for example the cooperation on removing
nuclear weapons from Ukraine, see Bernauer, Brem, & Suter, 1999). During
the Yeltsin years and throughout early 2000s, Russia behaved more-or-less
as a benign actor and even showed interest in integration in theWestern inter-
national architecture. However, especially after the conﬂict in Georgia, a
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development of an increasingly negative attitude could be expected. Even if
some parties in Europe saw Russia as merely reacting to Georgia’s provoca-
tions (Braghiroli & Makarychev, 2016; Klapsis, 2017), Russia’s willingness
to violate the sovereignty of another country could be expected to cause
unease among European parties.
The relationship soured over time and culminated in the Ukraine crisis and
Russian occupation of Crimea (Hopf, 2016). The party positions also could be
expected to be more negative after Russia’s invasion of Crimea and the inter-
vention in Ukraine, making it predictable that the parties became more nega-
tive vis-à-vis Russia over time.
Methodology
Positions on Russia
One of the reasons why the scholars studying the connections between
European parties and Russia and the scholars studying partisan politics of
foreign policy have not intersected is the type of data these scholars use. Scho-
lars looking at European parties and Russia tend to work with more qualitat-
ive research, with the exception of Gressel (2017), who conducted an expert
survey of foreign policy preferences of 252 parties represented in national par-
liaments and the European Parliament. While expert surveys provide both
reliable and valid ways of assessing partisan views of foreign policy (Benoit
& Laver, 2007; Hooghe et al., 2010; Steenbergen &Marks, 2007), the downside
of Gressel’s study is that it provides only a snapshot view.
In contrast, large quantitative databases have been popular among the
scholars of parties in foreign policy. One of the major sources of the quanti-
tative scholarship on parties and foreign policy is the Comparative Manifesto
Project (CMP) data. CMP has been considered the most popular source of
data to estimate party positions on a wide array of topics (Gemenis, 2013).
The main advantage of party manifestos is that they stated preferences of pol-
itical parties, which the parties use to attract voters (Pennings, 2017). Given
that they do not rely on expert knowledge, they provide a reliable assessment
of partisan positions over time.
Although the CMP does code positive and negative references to Russia,
there is not a single mention of Russia coded for any of the countries
outside the former Soviet bloc and Greece since 1920. Even for the former
Soviet bloc and Greece, there are less than 50 positions on Russia coded for
all parties since the end of the Cold War (Volkens et al., 2018). Yet this is
at odds with what we know about the Cold War, when views of Soviet
Union were an important aspect of domestic political battle (Everts, 1985;
Müller & Risse-Kappen, 1987), but also with the recent work on the partisan
connections with Russia cited earlier.
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Toovercome this shortcoming, and tomeasurepartisan views ofRussia in this
article, I use the data from a CMP oﬀshoot, the Manifesto Corpus (Merz et al.,
2016; Volkens et al., 2018). Manifesto Corpus oﬀers full texts of 676 party mani-
festos from the countries currently in the EU.1 AsMerz et al. (2016) state, the text
recoding is one of the most appropriate ways to treat the Corpus data. This
approach has also been taken before, for example in Horn, Kevins, Jensen, and
Kersbergen (2017), who recoded the CMP’s welfare codes.
Manifestos have been scraped for all references to Russia. It is important to
note that the manifestos were scraped using the web interface and not the
R package provided by the CMP. The chief reason for this is that in the
R package, not all manifestos are “properly” split into quasi-sentences, and
some manifestos are even inserted as one quasi-sentence (whereas in the
case of most parties, manifestos are sliced into hundreds of quasi-sentences).
I thus decided that instead of slicing manifestos into quasi-sentences, it would
be more reliable and valid to work with the data available from the web inter-
face. Therefore, I searched the interface for mentions of the root related to
Russia (e.g., “rus*” for Slovakia, “rusl* OR russis*” in the Netherlands, etc)
by country. In countries with more than one oﬃcial language, I used combi-
nations in all oﬃcial languages.
From the resulting data, I removed unrelated quasi-sentences which were
selected due to some linguistic similarity (eg, in Bulgarian, numerous quasi-
sentences containing the word “rus*” [Рус in Bulgarian] referred to the city
of Ruse [Русе]), or which contained only the word “Russia” (likely a
section header or similar). The quasi-sentences which remained in the
dataset were all hand-coded into eleven categories:
(1) Russia as a part of BRICS
(2) Energy dependence
(3) Human Rights in Russia
(4) Security
(5) Special Relationship
(6) Spread international norms & institutions
(7) Trade
(8) Destabilization threat
(9) Democracy promotion
(10) Ukraine war
(11) Disarmament
Furthermore, the ﬁrst seven categories were coded in terms of whether the
reference was positive or negative. For example, it was coded diﬀerently
whether Russia, as a part of BRICS, was seen as an opportunity, or whether
it was seen as a threat. Appendix A contains further information about
coding frame and guidance given to coders. Coders were recruited from
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among students and recent graduates with political science background; and
who were either native speakers, or ﬂuent speakers of the source language
(acquired e.g., through long-term residence in a country). The data was
then aggregated at the party-election level, and party-election is also the
unit of analysis in the remainder of the article.
The ways in which CMP measures partisan positions are intrinsically
connected to the issue salience within party manifestos (Budge, 1994;
Mikhaylov, 2009; Oppermann & Viehrig, 2009). By implication, however,
this means that scores capturing partisan positions change if the document’s
size changes, even if the position itself did not change. As Mikhaylov (2009,
p. 27) explains, the standard solution to this problem was to use a distance
function (Krippendorﬀ, 2012). Whereas in the CMP methodology, the cat-
egory scores are calculated as a ratio of category codes compared to the
total number of codes per document, distance scores take a diﬀerence in
opposing codes (e.g., left and right) and divide them by their sum. In
that way, we can achieve a more reliable measure of a policy position, inde-
pendent from the document size (Kim & Fording, 1998; Laver & Garry,
2000; Mikhaylov, 2009). In this article, I work with policy positions, and
use the distance function for categories where both positive and negative
codes were awarded. To arrive at the ﬁnal score, I divide the diﬀerence
of positive and negative codes by their sum. The score ranges from −1 to
+1, where −1 indicates that all mentions were negative, and +1 indicates
that all mentions were positive.
In total, 911 quasi-sentences mentioning Russia were found in the total of
260 manifestos. Most manifestos containing references to Russia had fewer
than ﬁve references, a result that testiﬁes to the relatively low interest in
Russia among the European parties. There are two outliers: one Lithuanian
and one Polish party. Lithuania’s Homeland Union—Lithuanian Christian
Democrats had 135 codes allocated in 2008, and 92 in 2012; whereas
Poland’s Law and Justice had 51 codes allocated in 2011. Both parties were
included in the analysis. The ﬁve countries with the highest mention of
Russia in partisan manifestos are Lithuania (309 [but see above], 23.8 on
average per manifesto), Estonia (154, 8.5 on average), Germany (148, 5.5
on average), The Netherlands (88, 2.69 on average), and Poland (88, 11 on
average). On the other end of the spectrum, there was only one mention of
Russia in manifestos from Denmark, Portugal, and Romania, and three in
manifestos from Italy.
Party ideology
I hypothesized that party ideology inﬂuences how parties see Russia. I use
three diﬀerent ways of measuring ideology. Firstly, I use the broad classiﬁ-
cation of parties based on the CMP data, which codes partisan ideology as
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ecological, socialist, social democratic, liberal, Christian democratic, conserva-
tive, nationalist, agrarian, and regional.
Secondly, I calculate a party-level nationalism score to estimate how
“nationalistic” each party is. To do this, I use the data on nationalism from
the CMP data, and I calculate the score as a diﬀerence between positive
and negative scores on the CMP item “National Way of Life.” This item is
deﬁned in the positive category as “Favourable mentions of the manifesto
country’s nation, history, and general appeals” (variable p601), and in the
negative category as “Unfavourable mentions of the manifesto country’s
nation and history” (variable p602; both the deﬁnitions are taken from the
CMP codebook version 2018a; see Volkens et al., 2018). This capturing of
nationalism has been used in the past in the literature (Colantone & Stanig,
2018; Lowe, Benoit, Mikhaylov, & Laver, 2011).
Thirdly, I look at the ideological divide along the GAL/TAN axis. The data
on GAL/TAN ideology were taken from the Chapel Hill Electoral Survey
(Bakker et al., 2015; Polk et al., 2017). The GAL/TAN ideology is scored on
a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 denotes the libertarian (post-materialist) end,
and 10 denotes the traditional (authoritarian) end.
Geographical regions
As argued above, it is expected that the geography plays a role in dividing the
partisan views of Russia, and that Eastern European countries would have a
more negative view compared to parties from other parts of Europe. To
analyze this expectation, I group the countries into four broad regions:
Eastern Europe, Western Europe, Southern Europe, and Scandinavia.
Countries are classiﬁed in these categories as follows:
. Eastern Europe: all post-1995 newly-acceded countries, except Malta and
Cyprus;
. Western Europe: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg,
The Netherlands, United Kingdom;
. Southern Europe: Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, Spain, Portugal;
. Scandinavia: Denmark, Finland, Sweden.
Results
Based on the three theoretical expectations, I look at the variation in par-
tisan views of Russia along the three categories outlined above: geography,
across time, and ideology. I start with geography and time. Figure 1 pro-
vides average party positions on Russia in all four regions over time.
Each dot represents a party-election, and we can easily observe both tem-
poral variation and the regional diﬀerences.2 To start with Eastern Europe,
534 M. ONDERCO
there is substantive variation across time among parties and countries.
While in the period between 1990 and 2000, there is data for one party
in each period available, data is available for substantially more parties
in the subsequent periods. In the 2000–2014 period, Eastern European
parties have been rather positive toward Russia, contrary to the expec-
tations presented in the theoretical section. After 2015, there is a
growing number of countries with a negative outlook, but a divide persists
and over half of parties maintain a positive view (on average, however, the
parties moved toward a negative view post-2015). Therefore, it is not poss-
ible to conclude that Eastern European parties have been more negative
toward Russia compared to parties in other parts of Europe, especially
compared to Western Europe.3
This overall pattern toward a positive view should not obscure ﬁnding that
even within the Eastern European region, there is signiﬁcant variation both
within and between countries. To illustrate this divide we may look at elec-
tions in Slovakia and Poland at the beginning of the present decade. While
in Slovakia’s 2012 elections, all parties that mentioned Russia held a positive
view of it, in Poland’s 2011 elections, parties were divided. Palikot and Law
and Justice held a negative position while Civic Platform and Democratic
Left Alliance held a positive position. In Slovakia, for example, Russia has tra-
ditionally been seen as country with shared cultural values, and as a bulwark
against the American imperialism (Malová, 2017). This ﬁnding corresponds
with that of Chryssogelos (2015), who theorizes that the partisan views of
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Russia in the European parliament are a function of attitudes toward the
United States.
InWestern Europe, parties were positive on average, until 2015. To be sure,
there has consistently been a group of parties critical of Russia, however, these
critical parties tended to be the ones for whom Russia was not particularly
salient, and these parties tended to have very few (one or two) references
per manifesto. The majority of the parties saw Russia either ambivalently or
positively, a ﬁnding also conﬁrmed in the work of Gressel (2017). This has
changed since 2015, and Western European parties have come to see Russia
rather negatively. While prior to 2015, parties tended to have more diverse
views of Russia, after the invasion of Ukraine, Western European parties
had a uniformly negative view of Russia. Exceptions to these rules have
been the Indominable France and Democratic Movement in France, the Free
Democratic Party and Alternative for Germany in Germany, the Socialist
Party and Forum for Democracy in The Netherlands, and the UK Indepen-
dence Party. These ﬁndings correspond with the prior scholarship, which
has found that fringe and hard Eurosceptic parties have tended to be more
positive toward Russia (Braghiroli, 2015), but also that in the post-Crimea
era, the parties with positive view of Russia tend to be on the far left and
far right (Schmitt, 2017; Stéphane & Schmitt, 2015).4
Similarly, in both Scandinavia and Southern Europe, parties have been on
average positive about Russia. Curiously, in the whole of Southern Europe,
four Spanish parties were the only ones who ever held a negative position
on Russia (United Left in 2000; Forum Asturias in 2011, and Citizens and
People’s Party in 2015 elections). This ﬁnding underscores the argument
that the European weariness as regards Russia is a response to Russia’s own
actions.5
To further unpack the variation, we analyze the patterns of issues
addressed by parties over time. Looking at Figure 2, we see important diﬀer-
ences in what topics are being addressed by parties across regions and over
time.6 In Eastern Europe, we observe variation over time, but the ﬁgure,
which shows the average positions, obscures the important variation within
the region. For example while overall parties within the region have tradition-
ally held a negative view of Russia when it comes to security (with some, such
as Poland’s Law and Justice, or Lithuania’sHomeland Union holding the most
negative attitudes within the whole sample), there are also parties that hold
rather positive views of Russia when it comes to security issues (such as the
Slovak National Party, Estonian People’s Union, or Lithuanian Social Demo-
cratic Party). Energy dependence is a similar case—on average, parties in
Eastern and Western Europe mention Russia in negative terms when it
comes to energy security, but there are exceptions. The most obvious one is
Slovakia, where except for the liberal Freedom and Solidarity in 2010,
parties consistently saw energy dependence on Russia as an opportunity
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(even Freedom and Solidarity switched to a positive view in 2012). This is
rather surprising, considering that Slovakia was the hardest hit country
after Russia stopped gas deliveries to Ukraine in 2009 (Christian Science
Monitor, 2014). Energy security is also seen as an opportunity with a positive
connotation in southern Europe.
The “special relationship” is a divisive issue among the Eastern European
parties which share a lot of historical past with Russia. In Southern Europe,
however, “special relationship” is seen in more positive light, frequently refer-
ring to historical ties between Orthodox religious communities (Klapsis,
2017). This is especially true because the positive view of Russia in this
region is strongly inﬂuenced by the Greek parties (especially Golden Dawn)
which held a very positive view of Russia in the post-crisis period.
Taken together, we see that the data did not bear out the expectation that
Eastern European parties would be more negative toward Russia. If anything,
on average it was the Western European parties which tended to be more
negative, but looking at averages obscures variation within regions, which
has been noted by scholars such as Gressel (2017).
Moving to the party ideology, we can start by looking at this slightly
changed version of Figure 2: Figure 3 namely shows the same data but
through the prism of party ideology. We see again that in general, all party
families—with a few exceptions—tended to see Russia positively on
average. These exceptions include ecological parties in eastern and western
Europe, conservative parties outside southern Europe, and special issue
parties in eastern Europe. Yet when it comes to the issues, there is an
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important variation by party family as well as regionally. As mentioned pre-
viously, prior research has theorized that party ideology, rather than national
allegiance, drives attitudes toward Russia in the European Parliament (Brag-
hiroli, 2015). However, we ﬁnd little conﬁrmation for this when looking at the
parties across all EU countries. To be sure, there are some similarities across
regions within the same party family: For example, Christian democrats in
both eastern and western Europe tend to be critical of human rights in
Russia; and conservatives outside southern Europe have a negative view of
Russia’s role in European security. But parties belonging to the same party
family may behave in a contradictory fashion depending on the region: For
instance, while eastern European socialists view trade positively in the
context of relations with Russia, the western European socialists see it
negatively.
This ﬁnding contradicts the ﬁnding of Braghiroli (2015), but it may be
explained by the diﬀerences between the European Parliament and national
parliaments; and the fact that within European Parliament groups, the
group position is often driven by a few particularly strong parties. Energy pro-
vides a similar example: While in eastern Europe some party families see
energy dependence as an opportunity (particularly social democrats, Chris-
tian democrats, and nationalists), in western Europe the energy dependence
is seen universally as a negative feature across all parties. In short, we
observe that party ideology interacts with region, and that there is no clear
pattern across parties and attitudes.
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Figure 3. Party ideology and positions on Russia.
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The look at the relationship between the two political ideologies and party
positions on Russia conﬁrms this observation. We do not ﬁnd any systematic
relationship between party ideology and the attitudes toward Russia, as
reported in the statistical analysis reported in Table 1 above. While this
does not mean that there might not be relations on the level of individual
parties, there is no systematic relationship between these ideologies and the
position on Russia. For example, among the parties which score very high
on the GAL/TAN, we ﬁnd parties hold both negative views of Russia (for
example, Law and Justice in Poland, or Reformed Political Party in The
Netherlands) and also positive views of Russia (Golden Dawn in Greece, for
instance). Indeed, many of the parties with high GAL/TAN scores tend to
be the ones that are often singled out as potential troublemakers or cases of
particularly positive views of Russia among European parties (see, for
example, Orenstein & Kelemen, 2017).
The link between nationalism and positive attitudes toward Russia, which
is often raised in relation to the far right (Braghiroli, 2015; Polyakova, 2014;
Schmitt, 2017), is not straightforward either. There is no systematic relation-
ship between nationalism as an ideology measured across parties and pos-
itions toward Russia, which is reported in Table 1. The reader should keep
in mind that the average score on nationalism for the parties included in
the sample is 2.15, but the score is as high as 7.5 for nationalist parties in
the sample (nationalist and agrarian parties are, however, similarly nationalis-
tic). However, the standard deviation (indicating the spread of data) is high
for the nationalism score among nationalist parties (SD = 5.30). The
“above-average nationalist” nationalist parties have uniformly positive views
of Russia, unless they come from Baltics, which is not surprising given the
public opinion about Russia among the non-Russian population in the
Baltic countries. However, parties that have a high nationalism score in
general (but are not classiﬁed as nationalist) tend to have much more
varied view of Russia: for example, in the Dutch elections in 2017, both the
liberal People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) and the nationalist
Forum for Democracy (FvD) had an above-average nationalism score (7.75 vs
9.02), but VVD was critical of Russia, whereas FvD had a positive attitude.
Table 1. Ideology and attitudes toward Russia.
Model 1 Model 2
GAL/TAN 0.03
0.03
Nationalism 0.01
0.02
Intercept −0.27 −0.17
0.25 0.18
N 185 253
Notes: Ordinary least square regression, standard errors (clustered at the level of parties) reported in the
second row7; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.
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Expanding from Braghiroli (2015), we could explain the VVD’s critical stance
by the party’s view of Russia primarily through the prism of human rights. It
is likely that nationalism plays a relevant role for the party’s position on Russia
only if it is a deﬁning feature for the party.
In sum, we see a very mixed eﬀect of party ideology. Some party families
tend to have similar views of Russia across regions, for example Christian
democrats in Eastern and Western Europe share views of human rights in
Russia. However, we ﬁnd that overall, the relationship between ideology
and attitudes toward Russia is weak, and we observe that parties often hold
positions that are a result of a unique conﬂation of factors.
The results also partially conﬁrmﬁndings from the scholarship on parties and
militarymissions; it concurs, for instance,withWagner’s et al. (2018)ﬁnding that
the GAL/TAN dimension does not structure parties’ foreign policy outlook.
However, neither do we ﬁnd that the left-right dimension, which they (and
numerous others, such as Hofmann, 2013 or Rathbun, 2004) see as structuring
the conﬂict over military missions, structures the conﬂict related to Russia.
Thismaybedue toanumberof reasons, oneofwhich I propose is the low salience
of Russia for most European parties over time—after all, European parties have
had very few references to Russia in their party manifestos.
Conclusion
This article has mapped partisan views of Russia over a longer period of time,
based on the revealed positions presented in parties’ electoral manifestos. In
the context of the current tensions between the European countries and
Russia, we should be interested in how European parties see the country. If
they hold any deep-seated hostility toward Russia, the potential for
cooperation would be very limited.
In this article, I shed light on the partisan perspectives on Russia by analyz-
ing all references to Russia in the corpus of party manifestos of European
parties (Merz et al., 2016). The corpus was combed for all references to
Russia, and these were then coded into eleven categories.
Three important results emerge from the present analysis: Firstly, until
recently, European parties have paid relatively little attention to Russia. In
analyzing the manifestos of all European parties since the end of the Cold
War, we found only slightly over 900 references to the country from 28
countries over a period of almost 30 years (which is approximately one refer-
ence per country per year). Secondly, prior to Russia’s invasion of Crimea,
European parties saw Russia positively overall; we found no evidence of
any widespread (or deep-seated) hostility. Thirdly, ideology is scarcely a
factor structuring partisan views of Russia except for faint traces (such as
Christian democrats in both Eastern and Western Europe tending to be criti-
cal of human rights in Russia).
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Curiously enough, eastern European parties are not anti-Russian—in fact,
western European parties were, on average, more negative. With the exception
of southern Europe, the overall situation shifted after 2015 when parties came
to see Russia more negatively. It is important to keep in mind that sometimes
even the same parties (and partisan families) see Russia in a conﬂicting way—
both in a positive way and in a negative way on diﬀerent subjects.
The results also show that nationalism as an ideology, which is frequently
seen as a binding agent among pro-Russian parties in Europe, is not what
drives pro-Russian attitudes among European parties. In fact, only the
parties for which nationalism is the deﬁning feature, and which are extraordi-
narily “nationalist” in their outlook, tend to have positive views of Russia.
The results contribute to a richer understanding of European parties’ attitudes
towardRussia. Far frombeing easily dichotomized as pro- or anti-Russian, Euro-
pean parties have over time held a rather ambivalent, but on average positive,
position vis-à-vis Russia (while remaining rather negligent). At the same time,
the results give further credence to the argument that for the majority of the
post-Cold War period, Europeans “have forgotten” about Russia.
The results from western Europe show that it is particularly the newly emer-
ging populist and Eurosceptic parties (mixed with the Dutch Socialists and
German liberals)whose electoratemightﬁnd the pro-Russian statements appeal-
ing. After the invasion of Ukraine, mainstream parties—even those who were in
the past rather positive about Russia—have turned critical of Russia, likely in line
with their voters’ preferences. In Scandinavia and southern Europe, the refer-
ences to Russia were the least numerous; Russia remained a relevant subject
only in eastern European and western European party programs (and even
then, only to a limited degree). This is in line with the fact that Russia has also
disappeared from the security policy and defence planning in these countries.
Finally, the results demonstrate that the new-found interest in Russia and
the recent appeal to it is indeed new. Positions on Russia have not been poli-
ticized before, and therefore the attitudes toward it seem to be a newly relevant
factor in the emergence of populist parties in Europe. If political parties start
politicizing relations with Russia to a greater degree in their national electoral
programs, this could be a new (and potentially interesting) development.
Notes
1. In this article, I work with the corpus version 2018a (also labeled as 2018-1),
current as of the end of July 2018. Current EU members have been included
for the whole period under study. The full list of all parties included in the
study can be found in Appendix C. While not all parties in all EU member
states are covered for the whole period of time, the data provides a reasonable
coverage of parties in most European countries. The CMP project continuously
develops the website where manifestos can be searched.
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2. We may also notice that there is a clustering of parties around the two extremes
(−1 and 1, meaning all mentions were positive or all mentions were negative).
Intuitively, these may come from the low number of observations—if a party
makes only one or two comments about Russia in its manifesto, it might well
be that these will be both positive (or negative).While it is true that the more refer-
ences to Russia there are, the less extreme the position of the party is, it is also true
that not all extreme scores can be attributed to the low number of observations.
3. This ﬁnding was also conﬁrmed in an OLS regression where individual regions
were used as dependent variable. The only region which had a statistically sig-
niﬁcant impact was Southern Europe (results can be found in Appendix B
online). A one-way between-subjects ANOVA to compare the eﬀect of
region on overall attitudes towards Russia conﬁrmed these results. While
there was a signiﬁcant eﬀect of region on attitudes at the p < 0.05 level for
the four regions [F (3, 249) = 5.09, p = 0.002], the diﬀerence between Eastern
Europe and other regions was not statistically signiﬁcant at the p = 0.05 level.
4. German FDP is an exception to this. Some scholars of Russian foreign policy,
such as Stent (2019) argue that it is precisely the desire to “see the EU go” which
binds Russian foreign policy and the hard Eurosceptics.
5. This ﬁnding was also conﬁrmed by an OLS regression where time periods were
inserted as individual predictors. The results suggest that all other periods were
statistically signiﬁcantly more positive toward Russia compared to the post-
2015 period. Results are reported in Appendix B, available online.
6. I do not report results related to democratization, destabilization, disarmament
and Ukraine, because these are mentioned very little (between 11 and 28 parties
in the whole sample)
7. The analysis included also region and period dummies, which are not reported
here for brevity. Full table can be found in Appendix B online. Model 1 corre-
sponds to Model D in the Appendix B, Model 2 corresponds to Model E in the
same appendix.
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